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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE
LAW: A TESTABLE MODEL OF STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR
ROBERT COOTER and STEPHEN MARKS with ROBERT MNOOKIN*

PRETRIAL bargaining may be described as a game played in the shadow
of the law. There are two possible outcomes: settlement out of court

through bargaining, and trial, which represents a bargaining breakdown.
The courts encourage private bargaining but stand ready to step from the
shadows and resolve the dispute by coercion if the parties cannot agree.

Bargaining is successful from an economic viewpoint if an efficient solution to the dispute is found at little cost. In technical language, a dispute is

resolved successfully if a solution is found on the contract curve with little
expenditure on search.
The usual approach to bargaining in the legal setting assumes that trial
is caused by excessive optimism on the part of plaintiff and defendant. ' If

both parties are optimistic, then there is no way to split the stakes so that
each receives as much as he or she expects to gain from trial. In these

circumstances, trial is inevitable.
* The paper's title is borrowed from Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950 (1979). We received
helpful criticism of the paper from the law and economics workshop at the University of
Chicago. The ideas in the paper were originally presented at seminars in the economics
departments at California Institute of Technology and the University of California at San
Diego. The research was funded by a grant from the Center for Law and Economic Study,
Columbia University School of Law, whose director is Lewis Kadin.
I The theory that trial in civil suits occurs because of optimism is developed in John P.
Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud.
399 (1974), esp. at 419 n. 29. This model of litigation is expanded in William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235 (1979). A clear
summary of the theory is in Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 434-400 (2d ed.
1977) [Hereinafter cited as Economic Analysis]. A similar analysis of the cause of trial in
criminal cases is found in William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.
Law & Econ. 61 (1971).
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XI (June 1982)]
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/82/1102-0011$01.50
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Our approach is different. In our model, excessive optimism is not the
fundamental cause of trials. The fundamental cause is the problem of
distribution faced by the players. The problem of distribution is to divide
the stakes in dispute. A rational bargainer will make a demand such that
the gain from settling on slightly more favorable terms is offset by the
increased risk of a breakdown in negotiations. Thus, the optimal bargaining strategy of a litigant balances a larger share of the stakes against a
higher probability of trial. There will be a positive risk of trial when
strategies are optimal.
A player's strategy is optimal when he maximizes his expected utility.
Our assumption that individuals maximize expected utility involves an
innovation in game theory as applied to law. In the usual analysis, the
players simultaneously maximize utility, and an equilibrium is achieved
when everyone knows exactly what everyone else is doing (Nash equilibrium). Uncertainty is eliminated. In our analysis, the players simultaneously maximize expected utility, and an equilibrium is achieved when
everyone knows the distribution of strategies pursued by others (Bayesian
Nash equilibrium). 2 Uncertainty persists about individuals but not aggregates. The persistence of uncertainty allows some disputes to end in trial.
Notice that, in equilibrium, the litigants understand the true structure of
the game, and their expectations are accurate in the sense that subjective
probabilities correspond to objective frequencies. In our model, equilibrium expectations are rational, not biased toward optimism or pes3
simism.
We wish to make predictions about the relation between observable
variables and the frequency of trials in equilibrium. Bargaining is like the
stock market in the sense that tangible changes have psychological effects. If the psychological effects overwhelm the tangible changes, then
predictions are difficult to make. We shall show that tangible variables
dominate psychological effects in the usual case, much the way the substitution effects dominate the income effects of a price change in the usual
case. Our theorems about the domination of psychological effects by
tangible variables enable us to construct a table of predictions. We shall
be able to answer some perplexing questions, such as: (1) Is settlement
more likely when transaction costs are low? (2) Is settlement more likely
2 The concept of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium was introduced by John Harsanyi, Games
with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian Players," 41 J. Manage. Sci. 320
(1968), esp. pt. 2.
3 Our model is consistent with the optimism model in predicting that optimism will lead to
a greater probability of trial, but it is not a necessary condition for trial that the threat points
sum to a value greater than the stakes.
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when bargaining is risky? (3) Is settlement more likely when the cooperative surplus is large?
Most of our predictions are consistent with the predictions derived from
the optimism model, but we ground the predictions in a more fundamental
account of bargaining. A more fundamental account of bargaining offers a
different perspective on a variety of legal issues as well as a few different
predictions. We shall illustrate the change in perspective by analyzing
externalities and legal institutions for reallocating the payoffs from trial.
Part I describes the framework of the model. Part II discusses the
domination of psychological effects by tangible variables, which is the
basis for comparative statics. Part III explains the table of predictions,
and Part IV applies the predictions to externalities and rules for reallocating payoffs from trial. There is little mathematics in the text. The
mathematical reader can refer to the Appendix for a brief presentation of
our model, or to a companion paper on file with this Journal which de4
velops the mathematics at length.
I.

FRAMEWORK: OPTIMIZATION AND EQUILIBRIUM

In order to develop the framework, we must characterize the features of
bargaining games which distinguish them from other types of games. A
zero-sum game is a game in which total winnings minus total losses equals
zero. 5 It is a game of pure redistribution because nothing is created or
destroyed. Poker is an example. By contrast, a coordination game is a
game in which the players have the same goal. 6 For example, if a phone
conversation is cut off, then the callers face a coordination problem. The
connection cannot be restored unless someone dials, but the call will not
go through if both dial at once. The players win or lose as a team, and
winning is productive, so coordination games are games of pure production.
A bargaining game involves distribution and production.7 Typically,
there is something to be divided called the stakes. For example, one
person may have a car to sell, and another may have money to spend. The
stakes are the money and the car. If the players can agree on how to
' Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks, Bargaining with Rational Expectations Applied to
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with J.
Legal Stud.).
5 Zero-sum games were first explored in the pioneering book by John von Neumann &
Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944).
6 Coordination games are described in Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (1960).
A definition of bargaining games and a discussion of solution concepts is in R. Duncan
Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions ch. 6 (1957).
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divide the stakes, for instance, if they can agree on a price for the car,
then both of them will benefit. The surplus is the joint benefits from
cooperation, such as the gains from trading the car for money. If the
players cannot agree on how to divide the stakes, then the surplus will be
lost. In brief, bargaining games are games in which production is contingent on agreement about distribution.
The fundamental obstacle to cooperation is the absence of an authoritative rule for dividing the stakes. It is up to the players to find a
division of the stakes acceptable to both of them. Strategy consists in
trying to maneuver an opponent into accepting an unfavorable distribution. The objective of a skillful bargainer is to convince others that he
intends to act in such a way that it is in their best interest to do what is in
his best interest. Such a bargainer transmits information and makes side
payments in order to maneuver his opponents into a position where their
perceived self-interest compels them to do what is to his advantage.
Inefficient outcomes occur when the players miscalculate, for instance, I
think that your sincere threat is a bluff.
Bargaining in the shadow of the law achieves a close fit to our abstract
characterization of bargaining games. The players are usually well
defined, consisting of a plaintiff and defendant in many cases. The stakes
are also well defined, such as the cost of an accident, the damage from
nonperformance on a contract, the property accumulated in a marriage,
the estate of the deceased, the assets of a bankrupt company. In pretrial
negotiations, everyone has an interest in avoiding a trial. The surplus from
cooperation is usually obvious, for example, legal fees, cost of delaying
resolution of the dispute, waste from a judicial outcome off the contract
curve. The plaintiff and defendant have an incentive to avoid trial, but
they have a disagreement over how to divide the stakes. There is a problem of efficiency and also one of distribution.
A legal dispute enters the public record when a complaint is filed. A trial
date is often set after the complaint is filed which puts a time limit on
bargaining. The simplest characterization of the bargaining process is a
sequence of offers and counteroffers for dividing the stakes. A settlement
is reached if the plaintiff's demand in some round of negotiations does not
exceed the defendant's offer. Bargaining terminates and a trial begins if
the trial date is reached before a settlement occurs.
In summary, we characterize bargaining in the shadow of the law as a
game with the following characteristics: (1) There is a dispute between
two players, the defendant and plaintiff, over how to divide the stakes. (2)
Bargaining consists in an exchange of demands and offers for dividing the
stakes. (3) Settlement occurs if the plaintiff's demand does not exceed the
defendant's offer. (4) Trial occurs if a settlement is not reached before the
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trial date. (5) The outcome of a trial is the destruction of part of the stakes
(the surplus) and distribution of the remainder.
Optimization
We have described bargaining in the shadow of the law as a game. Our
next task is to characterize the behavior of the players. Each player must
choose a bargaining strategy. We can reduce the choice of strategy to its
simplest elements by imagining that the plaintiff writes down her final
demand, seals it in an envelope, and mails it to the defendant. At the same
time, the defendant writes down his final offer, seals it in an envelope, and
mails it to the plaintiff. The envelopes are delivered just before the trial is
scheduled to begin. If the offer is at least as great as the demand, a
settlement occurs. If the demand is greater than the offer, then a trial
occurs. The mailing of the envelopes is a device for portraying the uncertainty of each player concerning his opponent's strategy.
This example can be clarified by using some notation to describe how
the plaintiff would compute her optimal final demand. Let the stakes be
$100,000 and let x be the plaintiff's share of the stakes, where x is denominated in hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus a settlement will occur if
the plaintiff demands x for herself and the defendant demands no more
than 1 - x for himself. Let P (1 - x) be the probability that the defendant
demands no more than 1 - x. Thus the probability of settlement is P and
the probability of trial is 1 - P. Let the plaintiff's payoff from trial be T.
The problem faced by the plaintiff can be written"
max P(1 - x)x + {[1 - P(1 - x)]}T.
This mathematical problem can be solved intuitively. Suppose that the
plaintiff is contemplating whether x is her optimal demand. If she increases her demand by $1.00, then she stands to gain $1.00 with probability P(1 - x). However, increasing her demand by $1.00 will increase the
probability of a trial by the marginal value of P (1 - x), denoted p. If a trial
occurs, then she will lose the difference between her payoff from settlement x and her payoff from trial T. Thus the risk of loss from demanding
more is (x - T)p. At the optimum, the probable gain is exactly offset by
the risk of loss: 0 = -(x - T)p + $1P. The plaintiff's optimal demand is
the value of x which satisfies this equality. The same kind of computation
is made to find the defendant's optimal demand.
' For simplicity, we have assumed that the plaintiff is an expected income maximizer in
this example. This is equivalent to assuming risk neutrality. In general, all our results hold
for both risk-neutral and risk-averse players.
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In this example, each player makes one final offer. Real bargaining is a
sequence of offers and counteroffers, not a single pair of offers. Consider
a more complex example from family law. A divorcing couple without
children disagree about how to divide the value of a house. If the spouses
can agree on division of the stakes (the house), then they can settle the
dispute without lawyers or a trial, and they can arrange for the house to go
to the spouse who values it the most. In the pretrial period, the spouses
exchange offers and counteroffers. As the trial date for the divorce approaches, both make concessions. Neither knows how much the other will
concede. Each decides how much to concede by trading off a larger share
of the value of the house against a higher probability of trial. If the concession rates are fast enough, then a settlement occurs, but otherwise
there is a trial.
Two possible sequences of bargaining between husband and wife are
depicted in Figure 1. If the husband concedes quickly, then a settlement is
reached at the time t *. If the husband concedes slowly, then the wife's
demand exceeds the husband's offer when the trial date T arrives, so the
dispute is resolved by trial.
We described the optimal offer in the simple example by an equation.
Direct computation of the optimal sequence of offers in the complex
problem involves a sequence of equations (dynamic program). In its most
general form, the sequence of equations turns out to be mathematically
intractable. There is a device which can be used to reduce the complex
problem to a form which is mathematically identical with the simple
problem. In Figure 1 the husband's strategy which results in trial can be
described as harder than the strategy which results in settlement. The
reduction of the complex problem to simple form involves developing the
concept of hardness as applied to strategies.
A rational bargainer forms a plan for making offers in each round of
negotiations. He will probably want to revise the plan according to the
way bargaining goes in the early rounds. We can imagine that a rational
bargainer anticipates the possible moves of opponents and constructs a
complete contingency plan before the first round of negotiations. A contingency plan for making demands will be called a bargaining strategy.
One bargaining strategy is harder than another by definition if a player
following the first strategy demands at least as much as he would if he
were following the second strategy in every round of negotiations, regardless of the contingency. 9 Graphically, one strategy is harder than
another if the offers in the first strategy lie entirely below the offers in the
second strategy, as in Figure 1.
9 A definition of the hardness relation between strategies is in the Appendix.
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Choosing the strategy of optimal hardness is almost identical mathematically with choosing the optimal final demand. If a player adopts a
hard strategy, then he receives a larger share of the stakes in the event of
settlement. But a harder strategy is less likely to result in settlement. If
the pair of strategies chosen by the players is too hard, then the dispute
will be resolved by trial. Thus a player finds his optimal strategy by
trading off a larger share of the stakes against a higher probability of trial.
There is no substantial change in the mathematical formulation of the
choice problem, which we discussed above, except that the choice variable x is interpreted as an index of the hardness of the strategy. (See
Appendix for details.) This approach makes the dynamic programming
problem mathematically tractable.
Expectations
We described how players find the strategy which maximizes expected
payoffs, assuming that each player has expectations (denoted P) about
what his opponent will do. Our next task is to explain how these expectations are formed. There are various economic models for the formation of
expectations, one of which is called rational expectations. 0 This phrase
means that expectations contain no systematic bias, that is, the subjective
expectations correspond to objective frequencies of the random event.
We can characterize rational expectations in our model by explaining the
source of uncertainty. Each player in our model has observable and unob10 The idea that expectations about macroeconomics should be rational has been developed into an elaborate theory. The first paper was John F. Muth, Rational Expectations
and the Theory of Price Movements, 29 Econometrica 315 (1961).
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servable traits. Players with the same observable traits, but different unobservable traits, will pursue different strategies. However, the expectations which a player has about his opponent are formed on the basis of the
observable traits alone. Consequently, each player remains in doubt
about what his opponent will do. Subjective expectations correspond to
objective frequencies when a player expects his opponent to act in a way
that corresponds to the actual randomness of the class of players who
have the same observable traits as his opponent."
For example, there are many divorces each year which require dividing
wealth and income. Each spouse will adopt a bargaining strategy which
we assume can be characterized on a scale of hardness. The objective
distribution is the actual frequency with which spouses with similar observable traits adopt strategies ranging over the scale of hardness. If the
subjective expectations correspond to the objective frequency, then the
spouses' expectations are rational.
What is to count as an observable trait? There is much latitude in the
model for answering this question. Our ultimate interest is in predicting
the way changes in variables observable to policymakers affect the ability
of parties to settle out of court. From our perspective, the important
observable variables are the ones which have explanatory power in an
econometric model.
In this paper we shall stress the assumption of rational expectations,
although many of our conclusions remain true if we introduce biased
expectations. There is a sense in which rational expectations are more
fundamental than biased expectations. If expectations of decision makers
are biased, then they will be surprised by the consequences of their
choices. If they are surprised, then they will revise their expectations. If
their expectations are revised, then the system is not in equilibrium. The
rational-expectations model is fundamental because it is intimately linked
to the concept of equilibrium, as we shall now show in greater detail.
Equilibrium
Expectations will be rational if there is a learning process by which bias
is corrected. There is a mechanism for learning in the legal setting. In our
divorce example, the spouses might seek legal counsel. The lawyers
would be experienced with such bargaining situations. It is easy to see
how bias would be eliminated from a lawyer's expectations. A lawyer
expects a particular strategy on the part of his client to result in noncoop" Strictly, we assume that subjective means and variances equal objective means and
variances in equilibrium. See Cooter & Marks, supra note 4.

PRETRIAL BARGAINING

eration a certain proportion of the time. If his expectations are disappointed, then he will revise them repeatedly until they are accurate. For
example, if the husband adopts the conciliatory strategy of demanding
only 20 percent of the market value of the house, and the lawyer expects
this strategy to produce cooperation in every case but the wife rejects the
offer, then the lawyer will have different expectations the next time a
12
similar case occurs.
The learning process which we have described will result in revision of
the subjective probabilities until they correspond to objective frequencies. The process will cease when expectations are rational. Thus the
equilibrium of the game is a situation in which subjective probabilities
correspond to objective frequencies. The equilibrium can be called a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 13 It is Bayesian in the sense that each player's
optimal strategy is derived from a subjective probability distribution over
his opponent's move, and it is Nash in the sense that no one cares to
revise his strategy given the strategies of others.
We could modify the definition of equilibrium to allow for biased expectations. For instance, it is possible that litigants are biased toward
optimism. Such bias might arise because of a natural impulse toward
hope, or because lawyers earn more money by encouraging litigation. To
incorporate bias into the model, we would define equilibrium as a condition in which objective frequencies differ from subjective expectations by
the postulated amount of bias. A study of optimistic expectations can
therefore flow from the rational-expectations model, which is more fundamental because it is the starting place from which to proceed to special
cases of bias.
Let us summarize our bargaining model. Bargaining occurs in a context
of uncertainty about how opponents will react to offers and counteroffers.
The basic approach in economics to choice under uncertainty involves a
two-step process: first, form your best expectations about the likelihood
of each possible outcome from acting; and, second, calculate your optimal
move. The two-step process is called expected utility maximization with
Bayesian probabilities. The fundamental problem in game theory is that
one player's expectations about another's move depend on the other
player's expectations about the first player's move. How can the two-step
process be applied simultaneously by everyone? The paradox is resolved
"I We assume there is no principal-agent problem, that is, the lawyer's incentives are the
same as his client's.
13 In Harsanyi, supra note 2, there is a different concept of rational expectations. Harsanyi assumes that players follow mixed strategies, but in our own model the strategies are
pure.
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by specifying expectations in the first step which are confirmed in the
second step. Rational expectations have this characteristic because the
subjective expectations correspond to objective frequencies.
II.

BASIS FOR COMPARATIVE STATICS

As in the stock market, tangible changes have psychological effects
upon bargaining.14 In order to enable us to make predictions, our model
must tie expectations to tangible variables which can be observed. This
section explains the link between tangible and psychological variables in
our model.
We shall illustrate the link with our divorce example. If the husband
acquires a pressing debt, then he will want a quick settlement. His direct
response is to make a more generous offer. If the wife knows that her
husband has acquired a pressing debt, then she will expect him to make a
more generous offer, so she may demand a larger share of the stakes. She
responds to the expected revision in her husband's strategy, which in turn
is a response to the new debt, so we call her response "indirect."
Likewise, the husband may revise his strategy in anticipation of his wife's
revision, and so on. If the bargaining game is stable, then the reverberation of indirect responses will eventually peter out and a new equilibrium
will result.
The distinction between the direct and indirect responses can be explained in terms of expected utility theory. Bargainers maximize the sum
of the utility of each possible payoff weighted by its probability. The
direct response is a revision in the optimal strategy that occurs because
the utility terms shift, without any change in the probabilities. The indirect responses are revisions in the optimal strategy that occur because the
probabilities change, without any change in the utilities."
Revisions in bargaining strategy will change the probability of resolving
the dispute by settlement out of court. It turns out that these changes are
easy to predict if the effects of tangible variables are not swamped by
psychological effects, that is, if the direct effect dominates indirect effects. By definition, the direct effect dominates indirect effects if the
14 Joke: A stockbroker died and found himself at the gate to heaven. Saint Peter said,
"You may come in, but the area reserved for brokers is crowded." Our hero went to the
designated piazza, which was indeed crowded with brokers, climbed the statue in its center,
and shouted, "Oil has been discovered in hell." Brokers stampeded from the piazza. Our
hero climbed down from the statue and fell in behind them. As he ran through the gate to
heaven, Saint Peter, who had observed everything, called to him, "Why are you running
with them?" Our hero replied, "They may be on to something."

1" See the Appendix for a mathematical account of the distinction.
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direction of the change in probability of settlement is the same as the
direction of the change attributed to the direct effect alone.
We can illustrate the domination of direct effects by returning to our
divorce example. Recall that the husband acquired a pressing debt and his
direct response was to make a more generous offer to settle the dispute.
The direction of his direct response can be computed a priori from economic theory. If the husband makes a more generous offer, then settlement is more likely ceteris paribus. A cascade of indirect responses follows. The wife's indirect response is to increase her demand. This may
cause the husband to increase his offer further in order to avoid trial. The
wife may increase her demand still further. This chain of indirect responses finally peters out. If settlement is still more likely after considering the indirect effects, we say the direct effect dominates the indirect
effects.
The analogy with price theory is very close. The effect of a price increase on demand is predictable a priori from economic theory, provided
that the income effect is small or has the right sign. Similarly, the effect of
a shift in an observable variable on the probability of settlement is predictable a priori from economic theory, provided that the indirect effects
are small or have the right sign.
In price theory, there is a long history of estimating income effects. The
econometric facts establish that income effects are small or have the same
sign as substitution effects in the usual case. This result is not surprising.
If income effects dominate substitution effects, thenthe demand curve is
backward bending, which leads to a disorderly reversal in demand as
price increases. Common sense suggests that these disorderly reversals
are rare.

We do not have a history of econometric estimation of indirect effects
in bargaining, but there is reason to expect that econometric studies will
establish that the direct effect dominates indirect effects. The reason is
the same as for price theory: if indirect effects dominate the direct effect,
then continuous variation in parameters leads to disorderly reversals in
the probability of settlement.
It is easy to illustrate this claim. Suppose that a change in an observable
variable increases the threat value of one player with no change in the
stakes. A player demands more when his threat value increases, so the
direct effect makes settlement less likely. Assume that this is an unusual
case, analogous to a backward-bending supply curve, in which the indirect effects dominate the direct effect. We are assuming that settlement
becomes more likely as a player's threat value increases. If we continue
increasing one player's threat value, a point will eventually be reached
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where the sum of the threat values of the two players is at least as great as
the stakes, in which case settlement is impossible. Consequently, the
probability of settlement increases as the threat value increases and then
drops precipitously to zero. This argument illustrates our claim that
domination by indirect effects leads to disorderly reversals in the proba16
bility of settlement caused by continuous alteration of parameters.
It is possible to say something more about these problematic bargaining
situations. Let us return to our divorce example. Recall that the wife
observed her husband's new debts and expected him to adopt a softer
strategy. In technical terms, the wife's subjective probability distribution
over her husband's offer shifted to the right. For purposes of analysis we
can decompose the shift of the distribution into two segments: the shift of
the mean and the shift of the variance, as depicted in Figure 2.
The change in the wife's expectations will cause her to revise her optimal strategy. The revision in the wife's optimal strategy can be divided
into two parts corresponding to the decomposition of the shift of expectations, namely, the revision due to the change in the mean and the revision
due to the change in the variance. It is possible to prove that the direct
effect dominates the indirect effect of the shift in mean expectations. Thus
it is clear that the problematic cases are ones in which the change in an
observable variable affects the variance in the expectations.
Our divorce example can be used to illustrate a potentially problematic
case. The husband acquired a pressing debt which made him eager to
settle. Suppose that he acquired the debt because he gambled on the
horses. Further, suppose that there is a lot of variance in the behavior of
gamblers when they acquire debts, for instance, some take wild risks,
while others turn conservative until solvency is restored. It is possible to
show that the increase in the variance of strategies will increase the probability of a breakdown in bargaining.17 Bargaining is more likely to break
down because miscalculation of an opponent's behavior is more likely.
Thus the direct effect of the debt is to increase the probability of settlement by making the husband's mean offer more generous, but the indirect
effect is to decrease the probability of settlement by increasing the variance in the husband's offer.
We stated that an increase in the objective variance in bargaining
16 Nevertheless, the analogue to Giffens paradox is not unknown. For example, suppose
the rule of law for a class of cases becomes much clearer, so that the variance in court
decisions becomes small. Most observers believe that trials will become infrequent as a
consequence. The reduction in variance will increase the certain monetary equivalent of trial
for risk-averse litigants. Thus the threat points (certain monetary equivalent of trial) will
probably increase, and, paradoxically, trial will become less likely.
17 The proof is in Cooter & Marks, supra note 4.
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strategies decreases the probability of a settlement. This amounts to the
proposition that settlement will be more difficult among strangers because
their lack of familiarity with each other increases the likelihood of a
miscalculation. Thus, the effect of a change in an observable variable will
be unpredictable when the direction of the direct effect on the probability
of settlement is the same as the direction of the change in the variance of
bargaining strategies, such as when the direct effect causes the probability
of settlement to increase, and when the variance in strategies also increases.

III.

TABLE OF PREDICTIONS

We wish to predict how changes in observable variables influence the
split between settlement and trial. It is easy to explain the logic of prediction in our model. A player computes his optimal demand by balancing the
gain from settling on more favorable terms against the risk of trial. Many
observable variables directly influence this computation. An increase in
the value of trial (threat value) will make trial more attractive, and the
player will demand more. An increase in the value of settlement will make
trial less attractive, and the player will demand less. The direct effect of
demanding more is that trial is more likely; the direct effect of demanding
less is that trial is less likely. In the usual case where direct effects dominate indirect effects, the sign of the change in demand will be the same as
the sign of the change in the probability of trial. Thus we make our
predictions by computing the direct effect of changes in observable variables upon the demands of the players.
Some predictions are reported in Table 1. We shall not derive these

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
TABLE 1
PREDICTIONS

Parameter Change
P1. Urgency of resolution
P2. Improved value of trial (higher certain monetary
equivalent of trial) for one litigant
P3. Increase in transaction costs of negotiating
P4. Increase in transaction costs of trial
P5. Increase in earnings per period contingent on no
resolution of dispute
P6. Increase in spitefulness toward opponent
P7. Less risk aversion
P8. Increase in familiarity of opponents (less uncertainty)

Probability of Settlement
Increases
Decreases
Increases
Increases
Decreases
Decreases
Decreases
Increases

results mathematically, but we shall explain the logic of each prediction.'s
A brief explanation of each proposition will be given, and then some will
be discussed in detail.
According to the first proposition, P1, a higher discount rate makes a
plaintiff eager to settle, rather than postpone, resolution of the dispute
until trial, so he adopts a more conciliatory strategy, and settlement is
more likely. The discount rate refers to a litigant's time preference or the
subjective urgency of settlement. For example, a divorcing spouse who is
eager to remarry would pay a premium to resolve the dispute quickly, so
his discount rate applied to the dispute is high.
According to proposition P2, an improvement in a litigant's prospects at
trial will make trial less risky for him, so he will demand more in the
negotiation process. If the litigants have a future interest in the trial, then
the value of trial to one litigant can rise without the value of trial diminishing for his opponent. For instance, an insurance company places
more value on a favorable precedent if it will apply to many of its future
disputes. If one litigant's value of trial increases, without his opponent's
worsening, then the first litigant's greater demand will make settlement
less likely (P2).
The third proposition concerns the cost of bargaining, such as lawyer's
fees and litigants' time. If a round of bargaining becomes more costly,
then the players want to settle sooner in order to avoid protracted bargaining. They will adopt a more conciliatory strategy in order to settle
sooner, so settlement is more likely (P3). Similarly, an increase in the
transaction cost of a trial, such as expert-witness fees, makes the
negotiators more eager to avoid a trial, so settlement is more likely (P4).
18

The predictions are derived explicitly in Cooter & Marks, supra note 4.
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Sometimes one of the litigants will enjoy special income as long as the
dispute is unresolved. For example, if possession of a house is in dispute,
one of the disputants will often enjoy the use of the house or the income
from it while the dispute is pending. An increase in earnings per period
while awaiting resolution of the dispute makes a litigant more willing to
bargain down to the last minute before trial, thus increasing the probability of miscalculation and decreasing the probability of settlement (P5).
Spite is, by definition, the willingness of a litigant to reduce his payoff in
order to reduce his opponent's payoff. An increase in spitefulness decreases the probability of settlement by making destruction of the surplus
more acceptable to each player (P6). Risk aversion refers to the subjective
attitudes of a person toward gambling. Less aversion to risk makes a
player more inclined to gamble and demand a large share of the stakes,
thus decreasing the probability of settlement (P7). If opponents are more
familiar with each other, so that each player has more information about
his opponent's likely strategy (smaller variance in strategies), then the
miscalculations which cause a trial are less likely (P8), as explained in Part
II.
Most of these predictions are consistent with those derived from the
optimism model. Our aim is not to refute the optimism model but to
extend its predictions by grounding them in a more fundamental account
of bargaining. Our account is more fundamental because it describes the
bargaining process, which is omitted from the optimism model. Since the
optimism model does not describe the bargaining process, it offers no
account of why bargaining takes time. In our model, bargaining consists
of exchanging offers and counteroffers through a series of rounds of
negotiation until a settlement is reached or the trial date arrives. An
increase in the probability of a settlement in our model is equivalent to a
decrease in the time required on average to reach a settlement. Thus we
could relabel Table 1 and regard it as a table of predictions concerning
speed of settlement rather than probability of settlement. This is an illustration of how to extend the predictions of the optimism model.
Including time in our model leads to a more detailed account of transaction costs. An increase in the cost of bargaining diminishes the likelihood that players will choose to enter negotiations. However, once
players are committed to negotiating, an increase in the cost of bargaining
speeds up the process of making concessions, as depicted in Figure 3.
Concessions are speeded up because the parties try to settle sooner in
order to avoid additional rounds of negotiation. Thus there are two opposing effects of an increase in the transaction cost of each round of
negotiations: players are less willing to negotiate (negative negotiation
effect), and more conciliatory in the event that they do negotiate (positive
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conciliation effect). An increase in the cost of a round of bargaining has a
negative negotiation effect, which makes trial more likely, and a positive
conciliation effect, which makes trial less likely.
The optimism model has no place for conciliation effects because it has
no account of the bargaining process. Consequently, the optimism model
takes notice only of the negotiation effect and predicts that higher transaction costs of negotiating will reduce the probability of settlement. A
feature of our model which simplifies bargaining mathematically is that
the parties negotiate with each other until a settlement is reached or trial
begins. Our model does not allow the parties to save transaction costs by
withdrawing from negotiations and awaiting trial. In our model there is a
conciliation effect, but not a negotiation effect, from increasing the cost of
a round of negotiations. Consequently, we predict that increasing the
transaction cost of negotiating will increase the probability of settlement
(P3).
We have explained why P3 contradicts the usual conclusion of the
optimism model. It is possible to think of situations in which the conciliation effect will be stronger than the negotiation effect, so that predictions
from our model will be right and predictions from the optimism model
will be wrong. For example, institutions that require good faith bargaining
as a prelude to trial eliminate the negotiation effect. If good faith bargaining is required, and the cost of a round of bargaining increases, then the
parties will try to settle sooner, thus increasing the probability of reaching
settlement before the trial date.
In the introduction we stated that our predictions would answer three
perplexing questions: (1) Is settlement more likely when transaction costs
are low? (2) Is settlement more likely when bargaining is risky? (3) Is
settlement more likely when the cooperative surplus is large? We answered the first question by our proposition that settlement will be more
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likely when transaction costs of negotiating are high if conciliation effects
dominate negotiation effects (P3). We answered the second question in
Part 1I, where we explained that an increase in the variance of bargaining
strategies makes settlement less likely (P8). Thus we have answered the
first two questions, but not the third.
Our table of predictions does not refer explicitly to the surplus, but
establishing that connection is simple. The surplus is the amount of the
stakes that will be destroyed by disagreement. The surplus includes the
transaction costs of a trial. ff the amount destroyed by disagreement
increases, with no change in the amount obtained by agreement (that is,
no change in the stakes), then agreeing becomes more attractive. If
agreeing becomes more attractive, then the bargainers will adopt softer
strategies, and a trial will be less likely.
It is worthwhile to relate our table of predictions to repeat players. In
our model, the players have rational expectations about the bargaining
strategies which will be adopted by their opponents. These expectations
are formed by a frequency distribution over litigants with the same observable traits. A player's current bargaining strategy will influence the expectations of future litigants. If a player has no future interest in litigation,
then he has no incentive for influencing the expectations of future litigants. If a player litigates repeatedly, then he has an incentive for
influencing the expectations of future litigants.
A player without an interest in future litigation chooses a strategy which
balances a larger share of a possible settlement against a higher probability of trial. A player with a future interest must also take into account that
a harder bargaining strategy today will cause his future opponents to
adopt softer strategies. Consequently, our model predicts that a repeat
player whose opponents are not repeat players will adopt a hard bargaining strategy. The situation is different if a repeat player's opponent is
another repeat player. The usual prediction from game theory is that
settlement will be more likely if both players repeat. 19 This conclusion is
confirmed by P8 in our table of predictions.
Insurance is an institution which substitutes repeat players for players
with little future interest in litigation. Our theory predicts that, where
insurance companies are involved in suits against individuals, the insurance companies will adopt hard bargaining strategies. However, if insurance companies are involved in suits against other insurance companies,
then settlement will be likely.
19For example, see Roy Radner, Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated
Principal-Agent Relationship (undated revision of 1979 paper, Working Paper, Bell
Laboratories).
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IV.

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Propositions P1-P8 predict the signs on variables where the dependent
variable is the probability of trial and the explanatory variables are potentially observable characteristics of the litigants. Thus we have produced a
testable model of bargaining in the legal context. However, the predictions Pl-P8 are not formulated in terms of legal institutions. The usefulness of our theory can be increased by bringing our abstract model and its
predictions into contact with legal institutions.
Externalities and Coase
The first application of our model is to harmful externalities. The
inefficiencies caused by externalities can be avoided by private bargaining, as observed by Coase. One interpretation of the Coase theorem holds
that efficiency will be achieved in the presence of harmful externalities,
regardless of the structure of liability law, provided that the transaction
costs of bargaining are nil. 2° If there are no impediments to bargains, then
bargaining will continue until the gains from trade are exhausted. The
gains from trade are exhausted when it is impossible to make one person
better off without making someone else worse off (Pareto efficiency).
Thus efficiency will be achieved by contracting around inefficient laws.
According to this interpretation, the Coase theorem is an application of
the proposition, "Bargaining games with zero transaction costs have
21
efficient solutions."
The term "transaction costs" has a curious history in economics and
law. Most theoretical terms eventually acquire a precise mathematical
meaning, such as competition, demand, utility, public good, etc. "Transaction costs" has never been pinned down. Most writers take this term to
include such costs as communicating and policing agreements. 22 If we
define transaction costs to mean the cost of communicating and policing
agreements, then it is not true in our model that bargaining games with
zero transaction costs reach efficient solutions. We predict the opposite:
settlement is more likely if a round of negotiations is more costly (positive
conciliation effect), as discussed in Part III.
The bargaining interpretation of the Coase theorem takes an optimistic
20 "[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources will be fully cured in the market by bargains." Guido
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, II J.
Law & Econ. 67, 68 (1968).
21 Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. Law & Econ. 427 (1972).
"By transaction costs, I have in mind costs like those of getting large numbers of people
together to bargain, and costs of excluding freeloaders." Calabresi, supra note 20, at 68 n.5.
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view about the ability of people to resolve distributional disputes and
cooperate. A pessimistic approach assumes that people cannot always
solve the distribution problem, even if there are no costs to bargaining.
According to this view, there is no guarantee that rationally self-interested
players will agree about how to divide the stakes. Rationality requires the
players to adopt strategies in which they risk destroying the surplus in
order to gain a larger share of the stakes in the event of settlement.
Rational players expect bargaining to break down in a certain proportion
of cases, even if the cost of communicating and policing agreements is
low.
The pessimistic view of private cooperation is articulated in Hobbes
and is probably much older. 23 It is based on the belief that people will
exercise their worst threats against each other unless there is a third party
to coerce both of them. For Hobbes, the third party is the prince or
Leviathan-we would say dictatorial government.
Hobbes's pessimistic conception of private bargaining is familiar in
criminal and constitutional law. There is no reason why the same conception cannot be applied to polluting a stream, breaching a contract, or
causing an accident. This line of thought leads to the polar opposite of the
Coase theorem, which could be called the Hobbes theorem: "Private
bargaining to redistribute external costs will not achieve efficiency unless
there is an institutional mechanism to dictate the terms of the contract for
dividing the stakes." The Hobbes theorem suggests that the law should be
structured to eliminate the most destructive acts. In the jargon of game
theory, law should increase the value of the noncooperative solution by
eliminating elements of the payoff matrix with low value.
It is not difficult to think of examples in which the optimistic and pessimistic approaches conflict. Suppose there is a small laundry which suffers from smoke emitted by a large factory. At issue is whether the laundry should be able to enjoin the factory. Since there are only two parties
to the dispute, the cost of communicating and policing an agreement is
small. The optimistic view holds that the outcome will be efficient
whether or not the laundry can enjoin the factory. The pessimistic view
holds that bargaining fails in some cases even when communication is
costless, so it would be dangerous to permit a small laundry to enjoin a
large factory.
Divorce provides another example. Research in progress by the authors
shows that 15-20 percent of divorces involving children are resolved by
trial. Our research also shows that the outcome of trial is easy to predict.
It seems difficult to explain why two-party disputes, in which the trial
' Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.
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outcome is predictable, would not be settled if transaction costs and optimism are the causes of trial, rather than strategic bargaining.
In the optimistic view, the need for government diminishes as bargaining costs diminish. In the pessimistic view, the need for government diminishes as the power of the parties to threaten each other diminishes, for
instance, as competition increases. It would be interesting to pit these two
views against each other in an examination of legal cases, in order to
allocate the truth between them. This paper is not the place for such a
24
comparison.
Reallocating Costs
Now we turn to a new topic: How does a reallocation of the payoffs
from trial affect the probability of settlement? One way to reallocate the
payoffs from trial is to reallocate legal fees. Another way is to contract
around the court's allocation of the stakes. We shall analyze legal institutions which reallocate the payoffs from trial by both methods.
One institution for reallocating the cost of trial is the so-called offer to
compromise. In California, offers to compromise are called 998 offers
because of the statutory section number authorizing them. 25 Either party
to a suit can make an offer to compromise, which typically is registered
with the court. If the offer is rejected and a trial occurs, then the party
who rejected the offer must pay the court costs of his opponent unless the
judgment is more favorable than the offer. For example, if the plaintiff
rejects an offer to settle for $10,000 and wins a judgment of $8,000, then
the plaintiff pays the defendant's court costs. Court costs are a significant
proportion of litigation expenses in cases involving expensive expert testimony.
The common belief that offers to compromise reduce the frequency
with which suits end in trial is confirmed by our model. To see this point,
let us consider the effect of this institution on the strategies of litigants.
Suppose that the litigants have computed their optimal bargaining
strategies without this institution. Assume that the exchange of offers
goes to the wire without settlement. The final set of offers just before trial
is optimal, that is, the loss which a litigant would suffer from a slightly
more generous offer in the event of settlement is exactly offset by the
expected gain due to the reduced probability of trial.
If the institution of offers to compromise is introduced, then the final
offers will no longer be optimal. Offers to compromise in effect tax hard
See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1982).
Steven Kirby & Dale Nance, Costs, Attorney's Fees and Interest, California Civil
Procedure during Trial (Calif. Continuing Education of the Bar, forthcoming).
24
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strategies and subsidize soft strategies; that is, a slightly more generous
offer will be subsidized by one's opponent in the event of trial. Both
players will want to revise their strategies to make more generous offers.
26
Softer bargaining strategies imply fewer trials in equilibrium.
Different legal systems have different rules for allocating the costs of
litigation. A difference between American and British law is that in
America the parties to a suit typically bear their own legal costs, whereas
in Britain the loser pays the legal costs of both parties. 2 7 We can use our
model to predict the effect of this difference on the frequency of trial.
Think of a trial as a gamble. The expected value of the gamble is what a
gambler believes the payoff to be on average. The expected value of trial
is higher under the British rule for a litigant who is optimistic about
winning the suit, and the expected value of trial is higher under the
American rule for a pessimistic litigant. The risk of the gamble is the
difference between the best and the worst possible payoffs. The risk is
greater under the British rule than under the American.
When trial becomes more attractive, settlement becomes less likely
(P2). Trial will be more attractive under the American rule than the British
for pessimistic litigants, because the expected value is higher and the risk
is less. Trial will be more attractive under the British rule for optimistic
litigants who are risk neutral or only slightly risk averse, because the
expected value is greater. Extremely risk-averse persons, whether optimistic or pessimistic, will prefer trial under the American rule because of
its lower risk.
Are litigants typically optimistic or pessimistic? We have already discussed the tradition of thought which holds that trials occur because
litigants are optimistic. If optimism is the cause of trials, and if litigants
are not too risk averse, then the British rule will cause more suits to be

tried .

2
8

In the model developed in this paper, trial results from strategic behavior. Optimism is a secondary cause of trial. In our model, expectations are
rational in the sense that litigants are neither overly optimistic nor overly
26 It should be noted that these results are based on the assumption of equal marginal
wealth effects and rational expectations as to trial outcomes. High optimism could lead to
the opposite result. That is, if players are highly optimistic, then offers to compromise could
lead to a higher probability of trial. See Cooter & Marks, supra note 4.
27 The British and American systems are compared, using the optimism model of trial in
Steven Shavel, Suit, Settlement, and Litigation: Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Methods of Allocating Legal Costs (1980) (unpublished paper). Shavell's paper builds on
Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 445-53.
28 We advance this hypothesis tentatively because extreme risk aversion may cause more
suits to be tried in the American system than in the British system, regardless of the
optimism or pessimism of the litigants.
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pessimistic. 29 If our model is correct, then we can predict that a larger
proportion of suits will be tried under the American rule than under the
British rule.
We have identified a test for choosing between the theory that trial
results from optimism and the theory that trial results from strategic behavior. If the American rule causes more suits to end in trial than the
British rule, then the facts favor the theory that trial results from strategic
behavior. If the reverse is true, then the facts favor the theory that trial
results from optimism. Of course, an econometric test of the facts would
involve multiple variables, since there are many differences between actual legal systems besides the method for allocating legal costs. Actual
econometric comparison between the American and British systems is
difficult because the social and legal environments are so different.
V.

CONCLUSION

In our model of bargaining in the shadow of the law, a dispute arises
over the division of an asset or liability. If the parties can agree on a
division of the stakes, then the cost of settling the dispute is low. If the
parties cannot agree, then a costly trial will be held which destroys part of
the stakes and distributes the remainder. A rational bargainer will trade
off the gain from demanding more against the higher risk of a trial. The
optimal strategy involves a positive risk of trial. In equilibrium expectations are rational in the sense that no player is surprised by the frequency
with which trials occur. Biased expectations, however, are easily incorporated into the model.
It is a feature of our model that a trial can occur even though neither
party is optimistic about its outcome. Trials can occur in such circumstances because each party is uncertain about how much his opponent will
concede in the course of negotiations. Uncertainty persists in equilibrium
because the players have unobservable attributes which influence their
bargaining strategies. In equilibrium, opponents know the distribution of
strategies, given the observable traits, but not the strategy of a particular
opponent. The equilibrium concept appropriate to such a game is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In bargaining, changes in tangible variables have psychological effects.
The psychological effects operate through the expectations of the players.
We show that the direct effect on a player's strategy dominates the indi29 The theory that trial results from optimism requires at least one of the parties to be
overly optimistic, because the objectively expected payoffs from trial cannot add up to more
than the stakes. If players are overly optimistic in this sense, then they are probably optimistic in the sense that both assign a high probability to winning at trial.
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rect effects that operate through expectations in the usual case. We can
predict changes in the probability of settlement caused by changes in
tangible variables by using economic theory alone, provided that direct
effects dominate indirect effects.
Our model has some implications for the discussion of transaction costs
and the Coase theorem. In our model it is not true that a settlement will
occur if the cost of sending messages and policing agreements is nil.
Furthermore, it is not true that reducing the cost of sending messages
increases the probability of an agreement. The Coase theorem is not true
in the limit as transaction costs go to zero in our model. The obstacle to
agreement is the strategic nature of bargaining, not the cost of communicating. Consequently, it is desirable for the law to eliminate the
worst threats which the parties can make against each other, even when
there are small numbers of bargainers (Hobbes theorem).
Our model also has implications for the analysis of institutions for reallocating the payoffs from trial. The institution of offers to compromise
creates a subsidy for generous offers and a tax on high demands, thereby
increasing the frequency of settlement. If each party bears his own legal
fees (American rule), then trial is less risky than it would be if the loser
paid the legal fees of both parties. If the expectations of litigants are
rational, rather than optimistic, then more trials will occur when trials are
less risky (American rule). If the expectations of litigants are optimistic,
then more trials will occur when the loser has to pay the winner's legal
fees (British rule), provided that litigants are not too risk averse.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
The arguments in the text are illustrated for mathematical readers by developing
our divorce example quantitatively. A lengthy development of the mathematics,
including formal proofs, is in a companion paper on file with this Journal.
INDIVIDUAL OPTIMIZATION AND THE OBJECTIVE DISTRIBUTIONS

Suppose that divorcing spouses must divide the value of a house worth
$100,000. For convenience, let us take the units of measurement to be $100,000 so
that the house is worth one unit. To begin the example, let us assume that each
player makes a demand, denoted b. If the demands add to less than one,
then each player receives his or her demand. Otherwise there is a trial which has
an expected utility of Tw for the wife and Th for the husband. We assume that there
is a set of observable attributes, w, and unobservable attributes, uw and Uh, for the
wife and husband, respectively. Each player has an expected utility function
written: V1 = A(1 - b;fzj,&j)U(b,u,w) + [1 - A(1 - b,1!j,-j)]T1, where A is a
cumulative distribution function which represents what player i feels are playerj's
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likely demands. We assume that A' is completely specified by the mean-variance
vector (i2J,6'), where ^ indicates a subjective variable.
Each player's choice of strategy is found by maximizing V i . The solution is the
player's optimal demand b, which is a function of the parameters of V i , namely, ul,
w, 4 i,, and 6-. Different players with the same observable characteristics w, but
different unobservable characteristics ul, will have different optimal demands.
The objective distribution of the optimal demands is denoted Ri for i = w or h,
with mean and variance (jr,6), where the overbar indicates an objective variable.
Given the distribution of unobservable attributes in the population, the mean and
variance of the objective distributions are functions of the observable attributes
), &i =
and the subjective moments. These functions are denoted: fi =/i (wj

EXPECTATIONS, EQUILIBRIA, AND DIRECT EFFECTS

We define equilibrium (iA*,o-*) as a condition in which subjective means and
i*
variances equal objective means and variances: (*,o-*) = (4,-) = (j!,5), or/p =
'(w ,/ ,oa The existence ofan equilibrium can be proved by using a
~w,p/zj o' *), o * =).
fixed-point theorem.
The total effect of a change in observable variables w is the change in the equilibrium moments: (Oi*/Ow) = (OWiOw) + (OI/O'1j)(pP*/Ow) + (O4/O6Q(Oo'/aw),
(O-*/Ow) = (O& /aw) + (aOi1/Oi'j )(1Li*/Ow) + (0&-I/O'-(O92*/Ow). The direct effect
of a change in the observable variable w is the change in the distribution of strategies which would occur if there were no change in subjective expectations. It is the
first term to the right of the equality sign in each of the preceding two equations.
The indirect effects are the changes due to the changed expectations alone. They are
represented by the second two terms to the right of the equality. The direct effects are
said to dominate the indirect effects if the sign of the total effect on the probability of
settlement is the same as the sign of the direct effect.
THE DIRECT EFFECT AND THE PROBABILITY OF SETTLEMENT

It is possible to show that a change in an observable variable which influences
the mean strategies 1L, with no change in variances o-, will have a total effect
whose sign is the same as the direct effect. For illustration, assume that there is a
change in w, which (i) has a direct effect only upon the husband, (Oai/wI) = 0,
and (ii) does not change the variances of A orA in equilibrium, 0 = (do.*Idwi). The
total effect upon husband's and wife's strategies can be written (d11h*/dwi) =
(4gh/Ow.) + (Ojih/Ogw)(dY*/dw,), and (dLw*Idw. = (cT/Ijh)(dh*/dwJ. Solving simultaneously yields
(dtlh*/dw ) =

1I- (aph/Iiw)(aiiu:/aIjh)]'

and
(dl'w*dwi)

=

1- (aih1/avw(aiW1/ah)
(ajgh/OIw )(6iiw/o9gh)
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Thus we have
dA h "

dw

dy w* _

(O,"/Ow)[1 + agw/agh]

1

dw

[(OhlOiw)(84w/Oi~n)]

-

For stability, the denominator must be nonnegative. Furthermore, it can be shown
that (07Wh0/ h ) > -1. Thus we have
direct effect

total effect
+
sign \ dw"
dw'

dw

=

sign

dwi }-

\"Owi}
T

A PRIORI ESTIMATION OF THE DIRECT EFFECT

If the left side of the preceding equality (total effect) is positive, then we predict
that trial is more likely. This is because the means of the demands are, on average,
higher, with no change in variance, by construction of our example. The sign on
the right side of the equation (direct effect) is usually easy to predict a priori. Thus
we can make a priori predictions of changes in the frequency of trial when direct
effects dominate indirect effects.
For example, consider the husband's optimization problem. He must maximize
Vh overbh. Let bh * be the maximum at equilibrium, so we can write: bh* = 4Oh(uh,
w, /2*, 6. The direct effect of a change in w is the change in b h holding expectations (1,6) constant, (0 4h/w), which is usually easy to compute. For example,
we can prove that persons with more debts, ceteris paribus, bargain easier. The
direct effect for individuals is the same as for the mean of the distribution:
sign

(

w

=

sign

(a

"

DIRECT EFFECT DOMINANCE: INTUITION

Heuristically, we can say that a direct effect which weakens one player's demand will increase the probability of settlement. That is, the second player will
advance by less than the first player retreats. An intuitive explanation can be seen
by noting Figure 4. Let us consider the wife's optimization decision. Let us assume
that she is risk neutral, for simplicity, and has the following objective function:
A (1 - b-) b- + [1 - A (1 - bw)] Tw, where R is the probability of settlement (no
trial), that is, the probability that the husband will demand less than 1 - bw . The
first-order condition for an internal solution is: - (b w - T w ) d1 = Rdb The left
represents losses from a unit increase in the wife's demand and the right represents gains.
and the wife's optimal
For concreteness, suppose that the mean ofAh is 11h =
demand is b w*. Now let the husband's objective situation indicate a shift in the
, with no change in 6 h. If the wife's
mean of his expected demand to 4~h =
optimal demand responds by increasing less than one-fourth, then settlement will
be more likely.
It is easy to show that the wife's demand will increase by less than one-fourth.
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that the wife's demand increases by
exactly one-fourth. At this new value of b w, the probability of settlement fi and the
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marginal probability of settlement dl/dbw are unchanged, as depicted in Figure 4.
However, the amount at risk in the event of trial, b w - T w , has increased by
one-fourth. Thus the first-order condition stated above cannot be satisfied, which
proves that increasing b wby one-fourth is not optimal. Since the derivative of the
objective function is negative at this point, the new optimum is to be found at a
smaller value of b w. Thus the wife's optimal demand increases by less than onefourth when the husband's demand decreases by one-fourth, and settlement is
more likely.
REDUCTION OF BARGAINING TO ONE-SHOT GAME

Our quantitative example is a "one-shot" game, by which we mean that the
husband and wife make one demand each. Real bargaining involves a sequence of
offers and counteroffers, but analysis requires reducing the sequence to a one-shot
game. The generalization of the concept of a higher demand is the concept of a
harder strategy. We reduce complex strategies to a single dimension by ranking
them according to hardness. It is worth describing how this reduction is accomplished in mathematical model.
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A bargainer forms a plan for making offers in each round of negotiations. He
will probably want to revise the plan according to the way bargaining goes in the
early rounds. We can model this process by imagining a superrational bargainer
who constructs a complete set of contingency plans before the first round of
negotiations. The offer xi at any period i will be affected by the entire history of
prior offers and counteroffers, denoted xi. The strategy of this superrational player
is a sequence of contingent offers, or a sequence of offer functions: (s) = (x 1 ,x 2,
.. XT), where xi = f(x,) all i -_ T.
It will usually be possible to rank strategies according to how hard or tough they
are. In our notation, one strategy is harder than another if the demands under the
first strategy are at least as great as the demands under the second strategy for
(x2,
U
I. T)
every possible contingency: (3) harder than (.) <= > [(xi,T 2.
. XT)].

The hardness relation partially ranks strategies. We assume that this ranking is
rich enough so that the players will optimize by choosing the best strategy from a
subset which can be ranked by hardness. Under this assumption, we can completely describe each player's strategy by characterizing how hard it is. The game
is reduced to one-shot bargaining by imagining that each player picks his strategy
before the first round of negotiations. Trial occurs if the pair of strategies pursued
by the players are too hard, which is the generalization of the assumption that trial
occurs if the sum of the demands exceeds the surplus.

